



Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for Boko Haram?

Michael Nwankpa

To cite this article: Michael Nwankpa (2016): Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for Boko Haram?, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, DOI: [10.1080/19434472.2016.1189445](https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2016.1189445)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2016.1189445>



Published online: 24 Jun 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for Boko Haram?

Michael Nwankpa

Department of Social Sciences, University of Roehampton, London, UK

ABSTRACT

The new president of Nigeria, President Muhammad Buhari, sends out mixed messages in his mandate to the Nigerian military force to defeat Boko Haram within the next three months (October–November 2015) as well as expressing willingness to negotiate with Boko Haram for the release of the remaining 219 schoolgirls under Boko Haram's captivity. Following a recent field research in the northeast Nigerian states of Yobe and Bauchi, and interviews conducted in Lagos, Anambra, Kaduna and Abuja, this paper considers the prospect of dialoguing and negotiating with Boko Haram. The paper concludes that Boko Haram's unrealistic goal of Islamising the secular Nigerian state should not dissuade the government from engaging the sect. Also, the remaining 219 girls represent to Boko Haram bargaining chips for any negotiation with the government. The paper also concludes that the Nigerian Government should aim at inducing moderation and flexibility in Boko Haram's demand by compelling the group to submit its objectives to public judgment through the existing political system, as well as carrying out a careful study of the group's sphere of influence (internal cohesion, sponsors and external connections) to better understand 'who' to engage with, 'when' and 'how' to engage with the sect.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 24 August 2015

Accepted 10 May 2016

KEYWORDS

Boko Haram; negotiation; terrorists; no-negotiation; dialogue; Nigeria

There is not a single theory of counterterrorism. For instance, Wilkinson (2000) highlights six approaches to countering terrorism including a military approach, political solutions, use of law enforcement and judicial control, and an educative methodology (that involves counter-narrative and other countering violent extremism [CVE] approaches). However, we can organise all counterterrorism methods under two broad categories: a war model and a non-war model. The war or hard power approach involves military solutions or punitive strategies, while a non-military model or soft power approach involves a range of political solutions, including diplomatic and conciliatory measures. The preference for either of the approaches depends on how we define terrorism and by extension, the terrorists.

Interestingly, the counterterrorism policies and practices towards the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria have involved a mixture of hard and soft power. The military response involves the proscription of the group as a terrorist organisation under the 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act, an extensive state of emergency in the northeast (NE) states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa between May 2013 and November 2014, and the

establishment of a multinational joint task force (MNJTF) comprising the armies of Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. On the other hand, the non-military approach includes several dialogue and negotiation efforts, legislative debate on the establishment of a NE development commission and a CVE programme coordinated by the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA). Yet, Boko Haram's six-year reign of terror in Nigeria and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Cameroon and Niger continues unabated.

To a large extent, the protraction of the Boko Haram insurgency may be due to the overt use of force by the Nigerian military. The Nigerian Government relies on the new anti-terrorism legislation and the global war on terrorism (GWOT) rhetoric to justify an excessively military response to the threat and terror presented by Boko Haram – an approach that not only radicalises the group but continues to sustain its violence and delegitimise the Nigerian Government. In 2011, Nigeria established a joint task force (JTF) – an inter-agency counterterrorism unit including the police, military, navy, air-force, custom and immigration. Two years later, Nigeria declared a state of emergency to address the Boko Haram crisis.

The 2013 declaration of state of emergency led to the dissolution of the JTF and, conversely, the attrition of the relative success of the JTF, especially in curbing the spread of Boko Haram beyond its NE base. The military became the major executioner of the state of emergency. It is within this period of unilateral power that Nigeria's war on terror received its worst ratings of human rights abuse including arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial killing, collective punishment and corruption (Amnesty International [AI], 2014, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2013, 2014).

While the overly military response may have protracted the conflict, the soft approaches have failed to make any much difference. The Nigerian Government has shown little political will to implement the recommendations made by several committees' reports on the Boko Haram conflict, despite the desire to seek political solution (besides military solution) to the Boko Haram conflict. Notably, the new government in Nigeria, the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari, which began on 29 May 2015, has indicated willingness to pursue a political solution that may include negotiation with the Boko Haram leadership especially for the release of the remaining 219 Chibok Schoolgirls kidnapped and held hostage since 14 April 2014.¹ Such a move will not be unprecedented as there is ample support for amnesty or political concessions to insurgents or rebels that surrender or seek a political end to their cause (Kiras, 2007; Wilkinson, 2000). It is against this background that this study is carried out to assess the prospect of dialoguing and negotiating with Boko Haram.

This article seeks to answer three key questions. First, is there a prospect for dialogue and negotiation with Boko Haram? Second, what does the Nigerian Government stand to gain (or lose) from negotiating? And, at last (if the government decides to negotiate), how should it negotiate? The structure of the paper follows five main lines of discussion. The first part will present a brief review of the NSA's soft approach. The second part engages with the literature on terrorism and counterterrorism. In the third section, we will describe our methodology. The fourth section will be a discussion of two main points: *popular support and legitimacy*, and *greed versus grievance* identified in the result, and the last part considers the prospect of dialoguing and negotiating with Boko Haram.

Nigeria's 'soft approach' to counterterrorism: a brief review

The former NSA to the president, Colonel Mohammed Dansuki, in March 2014, announced the Federal Government (FG) 'Soft Approach' to dealing with the security challenges presented by Boko Haram. The soft approach is to be rolled out in four phases. Phase one involves a de-radicalisation programme that targets convicted terrorists and detained suspects. The second phase includes a communal approach that envisions cooperation among families, community members and faith-based institutions with the aim of reinforcing values that will build resilience and aversion towards violent extremism. The third phase is a capacity-building agenda that entails a strategic communication approach for military, law enforcement agencies and media experts. The expected outcome of this phase is to build a communication output that is centred around the counter-narrative that: terrorism is un-Islamic; counterterrorism is not against Muslims; encourages Muslims to speak out against terror; improves Christian/Muslim relations and joint responses, and that counterterrorism is apolitical (with the aim of fostering bipartisan agreement on counterterrorism measures). The last phase seeks to build an economic revitalisation programme in the NE states.

The FG soft approach however presents challenges. The first phase of the FG soft approach is not entirely new. The government has employed a counter-narrative strategy in the past where it employed the services of moderate Islamic clerics to de-radicalise arrested suspects in prison as well as the vulnerable members of the affected society through special radio programmes (Sampson, 2013). This approach brought heavy backlash as prominent Muslim clerics who condemned the group were assassinated by Boko Haram. The vicious assassinations by the sect extend to members that leave the group or engage the government in dialogue as was the case with Babakura Fuga, the brother-in-law of Mohammed Yusuf (the slain founder of Boko Haram) who was assassinated by the sect on 17 September 2011 for attending peace talk with former President Olusegun Obasanjo.

It is unclear how past counter-narrative strategies used by the Nigerian Government differ from the de-radicalisation programme highlighted in the NSA's soft approach to the Boko Haram crisis. While such approaches have produced mixed results in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is not without its problems. For instance, narratives that counter the distorted ideologies of the Taliban in Pakistan are broadcasted through public media mainly the television. However, very few households have access to television and electricity and the counter-narratives are often too general in their audience target. For example, women in Pakistan are shown to have more influence on their children than the men, such that it becomes essential to build their capacity to de-radicalise their children. Disaggregating the narratives such that specific audiences are targeted is one way to resolve the issue (Aldrich, 2012).

There is the possibility of re-offending or 'recidivism' (Horgan & Altier, 2012). It remains uncertain how the Nigerian Government hopes to distinguish between 'de-radicalised' (change in ideological orientation) and 'disengaged' (change in attitude) terrorists. More so, a successful de-radicalisation programme will take cognisance of individual's radicalisation process and hence, a 'person-specific and not doctrine-specific process' will most likely be effective (Horgan & Altier, 2012, p. 84). It remains doubtful that such an approach is considered by the NSA and even more doubtful is available resource to reduce the risk of terrorist reoffending.

The second phase is quite important and perhaps accounts for the great reception that the government's soft approach has received both locally and internationally. A communal approach to conflict resolution is considered indigenous to Africa and largely used in pre-colonial period. Many scholars have been demanding a return to this approach (Oshita, 2007). However, the likelihood of success for this phase hinges greatly on government's transparency and political will. To win asymmetrical warfare like the one embarked upon by Boko Haram, there is need for cooperation between the government and the community. Not only does economic marginalisation of the masses and elite greed and corruption sever the government from the people, the blatant violation of human rights, impunity and inequality before the law will frustrate any form of cooperation. It is therefore important that counterterrorism is conducted with great regard for rule of law.

Lastly, the economic revitalisation programme must start now. Many of the government's non-military interventions and programmes such as the NSA soft approach and the Niger Delta Master Plan (a development framework to counter the Niger Delta insurgency in the oil rich South-South region of Nigeria) often relegate socio-economic development to the bottom. This may be based on the false notion that development is a long-term measurable process and hence should be at the final phase. Development, however, can be measured for short-, medium- and long-term gains. The Niger Delta presents useful lessons where huge amount of money has been spent, with little prove of structural development.

Theoretical insight

We shall begin this section by attempting to identify who qualifies as a terrorist. Like most terminologies in the social sciences, terrorism lacks a universally accepted definition. There are several definitions of terrorism, but we can categorise all of these under four discourses: academic, state, public and the terrorist's sympathisers' perspectives (Schmid, 1992). Schmid (1992) argues that while unanimity is achievable from the academic perspective, the states' definition of terrorism is far from uniform, and while the public notion of terrorism is shaped by the media, the 'terrorists' and their sympathisers separate and deemphasise the means applied from the political end sought.

Attempt is however made to identify consensus around the discourse of terrorism. A few of such attempts are worth highlighting. Schmid and Jongman (1988, p. 28) define terrorism as 'an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons'. Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004, p. 786) define terrorism as 'a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role'. Ganor (2002, p. 294) defines terrorism as 'the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets in order to attain political aims' based mainly on the means applied as well as the aim (which must be 'political' to qualify as terrorism).

The conceptualisation of terrorism still remains subjective (Hudson & Majeska, 1999). Therefore, this paper will not attempt a comprehensive discussion of this topic. Rather, the simplistic but interesting delineation of who a terrorist is, as given by Zartman and Faure (2011), will serve as a pragmatic choice. In this article, terrorists represent persons or a group that has been proscribed by the state (Zartman & Faure, 2011). This position implies that terrorism or threat of the use of violence is perpetrated only by 'sub-state'

groups with the aim of causing political change (Laqueur, 1996). This Hobbesian definition of terrorism is problematic as it excludes state terrorism, hence justifying a state's monopoly of violence or the use of force.

However, for analytical purposes, we will adopt such definition. Boko Haram will therefore fit well within this narrow definition of terrorism as it remains the only proscribed group under Nigeria's 2011 anti-terrorism legislation. However, how we define terrorism plays a huge role in how counterterrorism is framed. For instance, while some scholars view terrorism as a distinct form of warfare or conflict (Hoffman, 1999; Kaldor, 1999; Laqueur, 1996), some others only see terrorism as a tactic/strategy of warfare (Merari, 1993; Tilly, 2004). The former view supports a war model approach as illustrated by the US-led GWOT, and rejects the notion that terrorists are rational actors. This view underlines the logic of the new war and new terrorism proponents. The New terrorism proponents argue that terrorists are irrational in their objectives and use of violence, less cohesive in their structure, religious and distinct in the increase in lethality (Hoffman, 1999). Terrorism is also perceived as war to assert identity and to enforce a new world order often with possibility of using weapons of mass destruction-total violence (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999). Such thinking underscores the military approach and the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the US.

America declared war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. While the military intervention was relatively successful, Afghanistan and Iraq are far from stable and transformed (Metz & Millen, 2005). According to Echevarri, 'The new American way of war appear to have misidentified the centre of gravity in each of these campaigns, placing more emphasis on destroying enemy forces than securing population centres and critical infrastructure and maintaining order' (quoted by Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 46). Such a hard power approach shows tendency to be overt and disproportionate, often leading to a backlash that delegitimises the state and, sometimes, sway public support for the insurgents (Crenshaw, 2000; Kaldor, 2005). Speaking of public support, Millen (2007, p. 11) posits that the majority of the local population are likely to 'remain neutral and wait to see which sides wins the struggle'. However, if winning hearts and minds is essential to winning the war, the government's overt military approach will most probably work against it, especially that it cannot guarantee the security of the people (as it will appear in the case of Boko Haram) (Millen, 2007).

It seems more useful to view terrorism as a tactic of insurgency so as to avoid the negative outcomes of a military intervention. In this regard, counterinsurgency approaches will be more suitable. Counterinsurgency refers to 'population-centric strategies such as state-building, which focuses on winning the legitimacy of the local population and promoting good governance' (Rineheart, 2010, p. 37). Counterinsurgency is closer to the soft power approach. More so, contemporary conflicts seek political rather than military success and often present limited rather than totalistic objectives (Kilcullen, 2006). Hence, a political solution is more suited to countering modern insurgencies and terrorism than a military strategy. Modern insurgencies render Clausewitz theory of warfare inadequate. For instance, the notion that warfare is economics by other means has replaced Clausewitz's maxim that views warfare as politics by other means. Contemporary conflict actors achieve considerable amount of economics and psychological benefits. It is therefore important to apply a counterinsurgency measure that provides an alternative source of economic power and self-worth (Metz, 2007).

Methodology

Type of research

This study relies on a qualitative research design. We consider qualitative research suitable for gathering an in-depth understanding of the prospect of dialoguing and negotiating with the Boko Haram group. The research process involves a focus group interview of 10 participants in the NE state of Yobe, joint interview session of 12 out of 47 detained Boko Haram suspects in a federal prison in the southeast states of Anambra, the interview of two prominent members of the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security in the North and the interview of a JTF senior commandant.

Research area

The research is carried out mainly in the northern part of Nigeria, including Yobe state, Bauchi state, Kaduna state, Plateau state and the capital city, Abuja, as well as the southern states of Osun, Anambra and Lagos between 2013 and 2015. We collected our most recent data between June and July 2015. The Boko Haram crisis has been largely concentrated in the NE region of Nigeria, but the group has equally shown capacity to strike outside the NE especially in the North West regions (such as Sokoto and Kano) and Middle Belt states such as Plateau and Kaduna, as well as the capital city, Abuja and in neighbouring countries such as Chad, Cameroon and Niger. The scope of this research is limited to Nigeria, hence data have been collected largely from relevant sources within the Boko Haram zones of operation as well as those in strategic spots (such as detained Boko Haram suspects in a federal prison completely outside the northern region) in other states of the federation.

Sampling and characteristic of population sample

In terms of the population samples, we used a purposive sampling technique. We reached out to a credible grassroots civil society organisation (CSO) operating in Yobe state, in the NE of Nigeria, using a snowball purposive approach. The CSO was responsible for selecting our target respondents (including members of the communities, direct and indirect victims of the insurgency and counterinsurgency, members of the vigilante groups, particularly the civilian joint task force and members of grassroots CSO). We also used our network support to gain the assistance of the leadership of the CVE programme – a European Union-funded programme operating directly under the office of the NSA. We gained access to Boko Haram suspects detained in a FG medium security prison in Anambra state, through the support of the NSA.

Data collection

We used a combination of focus group and interview as instruments of gathering data. We used focus group method for our ten respondents (five female and five male) in Yobe state, and semi-structured interview for the Boko Haram suspects in the prison. The interview of the suspects was jointly conducted by the NSA task team made up of security forces including a naval commander, military major, captain, police chief, lawyer, CSO's language interpreters and myself (as an external researcher). I participated in a joint interview of 12 out of the 47 detained suspects. Twenty-five out of

the 47 suspects are men, while the rest are women and children. We supported the data with interviews of key respondents including one police intelligence officer in Bauchi (2015), a JTF sector commander (2014), an executive member of the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of the Security Challenges in the North (2014), a former military officer and popular Islamic cleric (2014), and an executive member of the interreligious dialogue and the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of the Security Challenges in the North (2014).

Procedure for data analysis

We adopted an interpretive content analysis process. As such, we deduced and codified most of the recurrent themes gathered from the focus group and interviews. We used evidence from secondary sources (mainly scholarly articles) to support the points identified.

Discussion of result

Popular support and legitimacy

During the early periods between 2002 and 2009, Boko Haram (known then as the Yusufiya named after the founder, Mohammed Yusuf) attracted large followership, especially among the growing mass of unemployed youths in northern Nigeria and neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Its welfare programmes (the Yusufiya group provided some form of credit scheme for its members) and its anti-corruption and anti-government messages resonated with the local populace, including non-Muslims (International Crisis Group, 2014; Walker, 2012). The JTF commandant that we interviewed alleged that the group had nearly one million members and admirers. He opines that:

His (Mohammed Yusuf) preachings were attractive because they preach against oppression, they preach against impoverishment; they preach against injustice; they preach against mis-governance. So people of whatever faith, when they hear what they preach, they became their admirers. They call them preachers of truth. These are people who could speak truth to Power. So they won a lot of converts from the downtrodden, the impoverished, the illiterate community. And, because of the influence this man garnered by the virtue of his huge followership and by the reverence in which his followers held him, he began to command respect in the society, in the town and in security circles ... he was so influential that if the police will recruit junior officers, they allocated slots to him. If the army will recruit soldiers, they allocated slots to him.

This same view is corroborated in the personal accounts of some of our respondents. In the words of one of the respondents: 'You know, to be sincere, at the initial stage, a lot of people were supporting them because they are [*sic*] expecting Boko Haram are fighting government, but at the last, they just started fighting everybody'. Another respondent provides a statement that explains why Boko Haram's message resonated with the local populace at the initial stages:

... there is one thing, two things to three things: first of all, by that time, as a result of Boko Haram crisis, the Boko Haram are always fighting with the Nigerian Police forces, two, are fighting with government, and three, are fighting with the politicians [*sic*].

However, since 2013, Boko Haram's popularity has plummeted with an overwhelming number of the Nigerian population having an unfavourable view of the group. A survey carried out by the Pew Research Centre find an overall 82% respondents, including 80% Muslims and 83% Christians showing negative attitude towards Boko Haram (Pew Research Centre, 2014). The Pew result shows that a significant number of the population do not support the group, as much as it reveals that the group has almost 20% local support. Interestingly, there are divided opinions in the literature regarding the significance of local support or 'winning hearts and minds' to insurgency and counterinsurgency. Some critics argue that terrorism, unlike insurgency, does not require the support of the local populace as terrorists use violence to coerce local support (Kaldor, 1999). Others argue to the contrary in their support of winning hearts and minds (Kiras, 2007).

As Millen (2007) rightly observes, insurgency and counterinsurgency co-opt individuals one way or another, as there are diverse reasons (ranging from adventure, ideology, grievance to need for survival) why citizens can support either insurgents or counterinsurgents. In the case of Boko Haram, Deckard, Barkindo, and Jacobson (2015, p. 15) identify 'household prosperity and perceptions of the Nigerian state' (rather than religious ideology) as some of the reasons why the local populace support Boko Haram. However, while the other 20% (the Pew survey silent majority) may continue to support Boko Haram due to preconditions such as poverty and inequality and precipitants such as government's excessive counterterrorism and incapacity to guarantee security of lives and properties, it could just be, as Millen (2007) suggests that they are neutral waiting to see which sides win the battle.

Nevertheless, the reason for such dramatic fall in the number of local support is not unconnected with Boko Haram's change of tactics and targets. Boko Haram introduced suicide bombing into Nigeria with the bombing of the police headquarter and the United Nation's building in Abuja in 2011, and has since proliferated the use of this deadly terrorist weapon (Nwankpa, 2015b). Its targets have also become less strategic and more indiscriminate since 2013 showing radical shift from targeting not only the security forces, government buildings and personnel, communication installations but now directly attacking the people, Christians and Muslims alike, Churches and Mosques and public spaces used by ordinary people.

Apparently, Boko Haram has transformed hugely from a group that mainly preached against and criticised government and other symbols of authority for their perceived corruption and injustice into a monstrous violent terrorist group. However, the environmental (political and socio-economic) conditions remain the same. A comprehensive analysis of terrorism or a terrorist group will include that of the socio-economic conditions that inspire and sustain the conflict (Caruso & Schneider, 2011; Crenshaw, 1981). Although most scholars agree that poverty itself does not necessarily lead to terrorism, many of our respondents identify poverty and mass alienation as key factors.

This view is aptly captured in the statement provided by one of the respondents:

Yobe is one of the lowest in terms of education. Yobe is one of the educationally-backward states in Nigeria. And in terms of unemployment and ... , there are also factors that push people into violent extremism-issue of exclusiveness ... since we are excluded from the government ... the government doesn't care about our welfare. Ok there is a group, since we can be given food. There is a group and if you are Boko Haram member or if you belong to any

group, you will be recognised and since there is money in this ... ok, we will have money to take care of our family. So, it push, especially the youth into this group [*sic*].

A significant number of people joined voluntarily in 2009, including university professors and university students that either dropped out of school or tore their certificates, as our respondents recall. Musa Kabir, a lecturer at Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University, Bauchi state, shredded his certificate in 2009 (The Associated Press, 2015). The police secret service agent that we interviewed in Bauchi confirmed the arrest of a university lecturer with four students in the Chemistry department of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University, Bauchi State. The Department of State Security also arrested a Saudi-Arabia educated lecturer, Dr Mohammed Nazeef Yunus, a lecturer at the Kogi state university, accused for leading a Boko Haram cell. Unfortunately, the people saw a common enemy in the government with its symbolic representatives that work together to oppress and impoverish them. However, Boko Haram has since betrayed this trust, and what exist between are, at best, a tacit support, and, largely, a coerced silence.

Since 2013, Boko Haram has indulged in kidnap of local populace. While most research and attention are given to the kidnap of girls and women, including the famous kidnap of over 200 boarding school girls in Chibok local government area of Borno state in April 2014, boys and men are also kidnapped and forcefully recruited into the terrorist army. Some of the Boko Haram suspects that we interviewed in the prison narrate how they were rounded up by Boko Haram, blindfolded and held captive in Boko Haram's safe houses. The use of forceful conscription implies that Boko Haram has lost legitimacy, a fact that is corroborated by the survey result of the Pew Research Centre and the opinions of our respondents. If Boko Haram has suffered the loss of legitimacy, the Nigerian state has even suffered a greater loss of legitimacy.

According to one of our key interviewee (Another key member of the 2013 Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North): 'what we are experiencing now in Nigeria, whether you call it Boko Haram today, or Ekpesu boys, or Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) or whatever, it is evidence of a state that is facing a severe crisis of legitimacy'. The legitimacy discussed here is the failure of the Nigerian Government to provide for its citizens basic access to health, good roads, education and in our respondents words, 'the things that the rest of the world, less endowed nations take for granted'. Yet, there is another kind of legitimacy that is no less important: the protection of lives and properties. 'The concepts of winning hearts and minds without first providing security rings hollow' (Millen, 2007, p. 11). Hence, the Nigerian Government has not only failed to protect the people from the attack of Boko Haram, its military and security forces have been accused of perpetrating some of the heinous acts of terror against the people (Amnesty International [AI], 2014, 2015). AI published the most damning report detailing the human rights violation of the Nigerian military's counterterrorism campaign. The heavy-handed policies and practices of the security agencies in Borno state's Anti-Flush security policy (one that aimed to bring discipline and orderliness in the state) and the FG 2013 state of emergency in the NE states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa worked to further delegitimise the Nigerian state.

Using the Just War principle of *jus in bello*, we can argue that the Nigerian security forces has failed to comply with the rules of engagement, and this will ultimately relate to

separating civilian non-combatants from combatants. It will be a political error and equally immoral to collectively punish a people or even a family member of a terrorist, 'whatever their emotional connection or disconnection ... they have to look for particular individuals who are planning, providing material support for, or actually carrying out terrorist operation' (Walzer, 2006, p. 5). This same principle applies to the concept of target killing and its corollary effect of collateral damage. One of our respondents narrates his narrow escape on 9 January 2015 as his home was accidentally hit by a government's long-range missile that has originally targeted a close-by suspected Boko Haram's safe house – an indication that Boko Haram is fighting urban guerrilla warfare. Hence, government's excessive use of force can escalate conflict and radicalise individuals (Crenshaw, 1981). Therefore, if winning the hearts and minds of the people is crucial in defeating Boko Haram, the Nigerian state with its forces is still a long way from victory.

Greed versus grievance

Is Boko Haram driven by greed or grievance? Scholars such as Oyeniyi (2014) believe that Boko Haram is driven by greed, while others like Adegbulu (2013) present contradiction in the attempt to present a delicate balance between the greed and grievance argument. The greed factor largely refers to the irony in the lavish lifestyle of Boko Haram generals and the life of frugality that they preach as well as the personal economic gains they pursue (obviously using religion as a cover). Hence, Oyeniyi (2014) largely divests Boko Haram of any religious objective, while Isa (2010) gives more attention to the socio-economic dimension of the crisis, and Adegbulu (2013) identifies both greed and grievance (frustration based on lack of governance and exclusion) without been able to draw a fine line between them.

However, Loimeier posits that Boko Haram will be difficult to defeat 'if basic frame conditions such as social injustice, corruption and economic mismanagement do not change' (2012, p. 137). Most of the studies on Boko Haram have recommended that the Nigerian Government improve on governance in terms of meeting to its basic responsibilities including provision of crucial infrastructures such as healthcare and social welfare that will improve its relationship with the citizens and give it legitimacy (Forest, 2012; Solomon, 2012). Although some scholars view the socio-economic conditions as intensifier rather than the main grievance (Gourley, 2012), many more view it as the root cause and hence recommend that it be addressed (Agbiboa, 2013; Osumah, 2013).

Relative deprivation contributes in no small way to the Boko Haram crisis. Relative deprivation is seen here to be closely linked to poverty and social exclusion. While there might be no explicit reference to poverty and socio-economic conditions in the grievances tabled by Boko Haram and in most of its publications post-2009 (Cook, 2014), there is substantial evidence that prove the arguments of many other scholars that Boko Haram does express legitimate grievances that are dangerous to ignore.

Yet, most scholars give more importance to other factors as causes of terrorism than relative deprivation. For instance, Piazza (2006), like Fearon and Laitin (2003), identifies large population and state repression as key causal elements. However, unlike Fearon and Laitin, Piazza (2006) magnifies ethno-religious diversity and lack of political opportunities as major causes of terrorism. Abadie (2004) also finds political and civil factors such as level of political freedom more crucial than econometric measures. Further support for

political oppression rather than poverty is evident in the study by Krueger and Laitin (2008). The quest for political power may also be fuelling the Boko Haram crisis. On the one hand, there is contest of power between the regions: between the north and the south and, on the other hand, between the different ethnic/tribal groups within the northern region (Fulani-Hausa versus Kanuri). There seems to be a contestation of power between conservative authority/elitism and popular radicalism/populism – a class struggle (Nwankpa, 2015b). Boko Haram seems to be disenchanted with northern Islamic and political leaders who have used religion/sharia to subjugate the talakawas (the poor masses). It is a challenge to the monopoly of power of the native authority (Lubeck, 2011).

The quest for political power is tied to the religious ideology, as we cannot separate politics from the Islamic religion. As such, Boko Haram is an outgrowth of Islamic reform movements in northern Nigeria (Last, 2012; Loimeier, 2012). The northern region is characterised by a long history of religious contestation between different Islamic variants and sects (such as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), Izala and Maitatsine) which have risen to challenge the dominant Islamic authority (Nwankpa, 2015b). Boko Haram's local religious conflict is akin to the global Islamic revivalism – a contest between a traditional Muslim sensibility and modernity dominated by Western ideals, and, ultimately, a drive to reinstate the lost Muslim hegemony (Lubeck, 2011).

Undeniably, there is a multi-causal drive behind the Boko Haram insurgency. Some of the causes, particularly the poor socio-economic environment in the NE of Nigeria, reflect genuine grievance or, at best, provide the pretext for the emergence of Boko Haram. Nonetheless, there is valid reason to believe that its transformation into a terrorist group and its six-year terrorist campaign are less sustained by this factor. The protracted Boko Haram crisis 'supports a war economy that is gainful to the group as well to some corrupt public officials in the government and its armed forces' (Nwankpa, 2015a, p. 32). Boko Haram may therefore be described as an opportunistic rebellion and may not be too difficult to negotiate with. However, such negotiations or counter-insurgency may not succeed without offering alternative sources of power and self-worth to the insurgents willing to give up violence (Metz, 2007). The argument that Boko Haram is underlined by an impenetrable religious ideology that forecloses any political solution (Walker, 2012; Nwankpa, 2014; Oyeniya, 2014) can no longer be substantiated.

Yet, the grievance argument remains true, but the precipitants: 'specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism' rather than the preconditions: 'factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run' are more crucial (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 381). In the case of Boko Haram, the precipitants (as identified by our respondents) will include: the extrajudicial killing of the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf and other key members, the harassment, including incarceration, of family members of Boko Haram and more recently, the excessive use of force by the Nigerian military including collective punishment among other anti-people counterterrorism policies (such as the ineffective military checkpoints) that alienate the people from the state and push them to the terror group. It is therefore not the grievance expressed by economic inequality but state weakness marked by poverty, repression and socio-political exclusion that sustains the Boko Haram terror.

Negotiation to diffuse Boko Haram

In terms of negotiating with terrorists, there are divided opinions. Some scholars support the 'no negotiation' stance (Hoffman, 2004), while others support meaningful dialogue with terrorist groups (Atkinson, Sandler, & Tschirhart, 1987; Lake, 2002; Neumann, 2007; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Underlying the argument of 'no negotiation' is the impression that democratic governments are giving in to violence, rewarding terrorism and terrorists' actions, legitimising terrorism and terrorists' methods, undermining the efforts of those that have pursued political change through peaceful means, destabilising the negotiating government's political system, undercutting international effort at outlawing terrorism and setting a dangerous precedent (Neumann, 2007; Zartman & Faure, 2011).

But, as some scholars argue, maintaining the notion of no-negotiation with terrorists is no less damaging than negotiating. Some of these scholars maintain that the government inadvertently dialogues with terrorists, whether it recognises this or not (Lake, 2002; Neumann, 2007; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). There is a dialectical relationship between terrorists (through their violent acts including suicide bombs, publication of terrorist materials on the Internet) and responding governments (through restricting of human rights and freedom and other undemocratic policies) (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). In essence, there is some form of meta-dialogue in the actions of the terrorists and the reactions of a government or multilateral force. It is therefore in the best interest of the government to seek how to engage the terrorists in a meaningful way (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005).

Notably, many Boko Haram scholars and commentators are not that much disinclined to the prospect of dialogue and even negotiation with Boko Haram. More so, the Nigerian Government has shown willingness to offer political solution including amnesty to Boko Haram members that are ready to surrender their arms. President Goodluck Jonathan inaugurated an eight-man committee in 2011 headed by Ambassador Usman Gamji Galtimari (a former ambassador to the Republic of Chad) charged with the mandate of investigating the security challenges in the NE and advising the government on how to end it. The committee, in its 26 September 2011 report, recommended dialogue and amnesty for Boko Haram members that renounce violence (ICG, 2014). A similar committee: Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North was inaugurated on 24 April 2013. The recommendations by this White Paper reports have been largely ignored (as one of our key respondents claim).

There is a strong possibility that some government officials may be collaborating with criminal elements within the group to defraud the government. The court ruling against three arraigned Boko Haram suspects, whom have received a pay-out of Nigerian Naira 70 million from a member of the government's amnesty committee under the impression that they will convince the group to surrender their arms, clearly demonstrates this point (Nwankpa, 2015a). Another possibility is that the government does not have a 'clear understanding of the perceptions, associations, and scope of [Boko Haram's] network' (Nwankpa, 2014, p. 73). To offer a fair assessment of the government's past dialogue and negotiation attempts, we may argue that it is most likely that the government has been engaging the more moderate faction of the group in discussion, as it is this faction that is likely to accept government concessions. It is instructive to note that for there to be any successful dialogue and negotiation with Boko Haram, the government

needs to adopt an inclusive process, which will involve main spoilers in the dialogue (Nwankpa, 2014).

From all indications, most especially the public rebuttal by Shekau of any dialogue with the government, one can conclude that the Nigerian Government has not managed to get the main spoiler (ostensibly, the Shekau-led faction) on the negotiation table. One of our respondents has rightly opined that getting the leaders of Boko Haram is crucial to ending the conflict.

There is both factual and scholarly evidence for her claim. For example, the Niger Delta Amnesty was relatively successful because the Yar'Adua administration identified and negotiated with key leaders driving the insurgency. It is also likely because the Niger Delta insurgent groups were united under a common umbrella – the MEND. The final ceasefire in July 1997 by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 became largely possible because of the inclusion of Sinn Fein in the Northern Ireland peace talks (Murray & Tonge, 2005). While the just war principle and international law prohibits the killing of political leaders based on the 'assumption that the war will end, and should end, with a peace agreement negotiated with those same leaders' (Walzer, 2006, p. 6), we can identify terror group leaders that are inclined to the group's political rather than its military agenda. It is prudent to seek out such politically minded leaders with whom to dialogue and possibly negotiate.

The JTF succeeded in 2012 to apprehend several senior Boko Haram leaders. Some of the detained Boko Haram commandants provided useful information such as location of key Boko Haram leaders that helped the security agencies foil some of Boko Haram's planned attacks resulting in the arrest and death of some of Boko Haram's top commandants such as Kabiru Sokoto, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Abul Qaqa. This was due to a possible internal crisis within the Boko Haram organisation particularly in connection to its leadership ethnic thrust.

There is consensus around the view that terrorism or insurgency is used to achieve political goals (Crenshaw, 1981; Fearon & Laitin, 2003), although 'some groups are less realistic about the logic of means and ends than others' (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 386). Hence, it is possible, as Walzer (2006) argues, to find terror groups that have limited terroristic goals. Some examples of these are the IRA of Northern Ireland, Basque Homeland and Freedom and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The Society of the Muslim Brothers, popularly called The Muslim Brotherhood, is a clear example of a terrorist group that has succeeded politically, particularly in Egypt, the place of its origin. As of 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood gained political recognition and won several electoral positions, including the highest political position. In 2012, President Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically elected president in Egypt under the platform of the Brotherhood's political party: Freedom and Justice Party.

Similarly, Hamas maintains a very popular and successful political party: Reform and Change Party in Palestine, as well as a violent terrorist campaign against Israel. Also, Hezbollah, a Shia Muslim group, presents a dual nature as it has been involved in the political system in Lebanon since 1992, at the same time maintaining a strong anti-Israel stance (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2008). These Islamic fundamentalist movements have, at one point, transformed from terrorist groups to political parties or at most, shown pretentious separation between a terror agenda and a political campaign. Despite the uncertainty of intentions, the possibility of abandoning terror for a political solution presents

hope for Boko Haram. At the early stages of the group's formation, between 2002 and 2009, Boko Haram was hugely involved in the politics of Borno state. Mohammed Yusuf and his followers played a huge role in the electoral victory of Ali Modu Sheriff, the Governor of Borno state from 2003 to 2007. Some members of Boko Haram also held key positions in Governor Sheriff's government. It is therefore not far-fetched to hope that Boko Haram, in its current stage and under its current leader, may not be predisposed towards a democratic solution.

Boko Haram is a Sunni Muslim group of the Salafi-Wahhabi variant, but it is not the only Salafi group in northern Nigeria. The Jama'at Izalatul Bid'a Wa Iqamatis Sunnah (Society of Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunnah) known as the Izala or Yan Izala is one out of many others. There are other fundamentalist Islamic groups in Nigeria. The IMN, like the Hezbollah group in Lebanon, is a Shia Islamic organisation led by Ibrahim el-Zakzaky. Despite the differences in their Islamic ideology, the IMN, Boko Haram and other Salafist groups in Nigeria, including the conservative Sufi Muslim authority all share the same sentiment about the Sharia law (Nwankpa, 2015b). However, the Boko Haram group is different from the others in its strong rejection of Western education, democratic participation and public role of women (Zenn, 2013). The Sufi group supports the predominance of the Nigerian secular constitution, while the IMN and other Salafist group, including the Izala support, to some degree, political participation, while maintaining the superiority of the Sharia law (Nwankpa, 2015b).

From the foregoing, it is easy to see why there is scepticism regarding possible negotiation with Boko Haram. It is however pertinent to distinguish the two types of concessions that the government can yield to Boko Haram: primary and secondary. The primary concession will involve yielding to the group's stated objectives of replacing the Nigerian constitution with the sharia law. The primary concession poses a serious challenge to Nigeria's political system and a substantial threat to its multi-cultural and multi-religious character. It is this seemingly difficult proposition that makes Oyeniya (2014) dismiss the idea of negotiation with Boko Haram. Oyeniya (2014) draws a clear boundary between the group's stated objectives (mainly the Islamisation of Nigeria) and its more negotiable objectives (mainly political and socio-economic needs including reparation to the group, releasing its detained members and providing governance).

Boko Haram's goal of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria should be seen as a corollary of the internal dynamics among competing Islamic ideals and movements in northern Nigeria (Loimeier, 2012; Last, 2012; Nwankpa, 2015b). Oyeniya (2014) argues that the resolution of this conflict should be entirely left in the hands of the northern people. This can be interpreted as the harmonisation of Islamic ideals (potentially under the leadership of the conservative Islamic authority in Nigeria – the Sultan) (Cook, 2014). Similarly, Last (2012) suggests that sharia practice in northern Nigeria can be accommodated by the Nigerian constitution. But, as I have argued elsewhere, the place of sharia in the public space should be clearly defined (Nwankpa, 2015b). The debate should not exclude any part of Nigeria. The Nigerian Government can increase its bargaining power such that Boko Haram's objectives can be publicly tested in a democratic election. Even if Boko Haram accepts democracy, it may not stand a chance in a democratic election due to its terrorist acts against the people since 2012. The government can capitalise on this gain and thus force Boko Haram to submit its objectives to the existing political system. For the Nigerian Government to be able to do this, it will have to adopt a more ethical

and balanced counterterrorism strategy that guarantees the protection of human rights. A moderate approach can be achieved in a multilateral cooperation, as cooperating countries can sometimes act as watchdogs (Lake, 2002). Chad and Niger have accused the Nigerian forces on several occasions, but despite the distrust among the MNJTF, the MNJTF has made some useful gains against the Boko Haram sect as well as offering legitimacy to the Nigerian forces.

Boko Haram's kidnap of over 200 teenage school girls in the Chibok area in Borno state somehow indicates that the group may be open to dialogue. We need to understand that the remaining 219 girls are used by Boko Haram as bargaining chips to, in the words of Atkinson et al. (1987, p. 3), 'achieve the greatest possible demand'. The kidnap of the schoolgirls has sparked global outrage and criticism, leading to the popular twitter hash tag #BringBackOurGirls retweeted by public figures such as Michele Obama, as well as international governments' and agencies' proscription of the group and offer of military and technical assistance from the governments of the US, UK, China, France and Israel.

It is therefore not surprising that the basis of negotiation with the group has been framed around the kidnapped Chibok girls, despite the fact that Boko Haram has kidnapped over 2000 women and girls since 2012 (Al, 2015). President Buhari, contrary to his pre-election tough talk against amnesty and negotiation, has expressed willingness to negotiate with the group for the release of the girls. Based on past failed negotiation attempts, it can be concluded that the negotiations had focused mainly on secondary concession that includes unconditional release of detained Boko Haram commandants. It is not clear, if such amnesty extends to the top hierarchy of the sect, such as Abubakar Shekau.

Amnesty and unconditional pardon to Boko Haram leaders such as Shekau potentially violates the notion of justice for victims and the rule of law that requires prosecution for violators (Nwankpa, 2014; Sampson, 2013), yet, some form of amnesty may be necessary for the enjoyment of lasting peace. It may yield success in dissuading the group from pursuing its primary objectives as well as halting the dissidents' recourse to the use of violence (Neumann, 2007). Ultimately, the negotiating government bears the burden of balancing the people's expectations, the competing interests of the terrorists, as well, as the expectations of the opposing party (Neumann, 2007).

More pertinently, the Nigerian Government needs to have a clear understanding of *who* it is negotiating with, *when* to negotiate and *how* it should negotiate. It is apparent that the Nigerian Government has engaged in dialogue with criminal individuals that are Boko Haram impostors, or at most, with less powerful and less influential Boko Haram cell leaders. To be successful, the government must have a better understanding of the internal dynamics of Boko Haram including its degree of cohesion or fragmentation and sponsors. Evidently, Boko Haram is factionalised. This presents a serious challenge to the Nigerian Government, yet, it must try and identify the more powerful and influential factions. At the moment, any negotiation with Boko Haram must include Shekau's faction.

The timing of negotiation is also crucial. Cook (2011) argues that Boko Haram must no longer be in its state of exaltation before negotiation can be initiated. Neumann (2007, p. 132) avers that 'a terrorist group must be at a strategic juncture ... questioning the utility of violence but not necessarily on the verge of defeat'. Since the MNJTF offensive earlier this year (2015), Boko Haram has suffered severe setback as it has lost the vast

mass of land that it briefly controlled. Its attacks have also reduced and the Nigerian forces have rescued thousands of kidnapped girls and women. This offers both the government and the insurgents the opportunity to dialogue, with the government standing a favourable chance at the negotiating table. This does not in any way suggest that a political solution alone will bring about lasting solution to the Boko Haram crisis. We can argue that many Boko Haram members are driven by greed rather than the sole desire to realise an Islamic state. The upsurge in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, including attempt to attack Lagos: the economic centre of Nigeria, may be an attempt by Boko haram to 'enhance its economic incentives to negotiate about political power' (Nwankpa, 2015a, p. 36).

There is need therefore to combine political solution with law enforcement and judicial control as well as educative solutions (Metz, 2007; Walzer, 2006). Walzer (2006, p. 5) opines that the "war" against terrorism is closer [...] to police work than to actual combat [and, hence] must operate within the constraints of constitutional democracy'. In essence, the Nigerian Government must adopt a multi-pronged approach as many of the respondents say and as supported in the literature.

Conclusion

Dialoguing and, more importantly, negotiating with terrorist present opportunities as well as challenges. In terms of opportunities, it may lead to the end of the conflict and a prevention of future conflict. In terms of challenges, the negotiating government may be faced not with the problem of negotiating per se but achieving balance in the amount of concession given to the group, as too much concession may undercut the government's political system and possibly encourage other dissident groups to follow the path of violence, while too little (or none) concession may protract the violence. Boko Haram, just like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Palestine's Hamas, and Lebanon's Hezbollah, can transform itself into a political party (although it is rather doubtful if it will and, even if it does, its unpopularity may work against it). Let us not forget that Boko Haram once enjoyed popular support, especially under Mohammed Yusuf. Also, at the early stages under Yusuf, the group played a major role in the local politics in Borno state. We may argue that Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau is irredeemable, but its earlier participation in politics indicates that the government may be able to convince its more politically minded members to submit its objectives to public judgment in an election.

The Nigerian Government must retain its current advantage. This can be easily lost by a focus on an extensive military and security approach. The establishment of a multinational army, including inter-agency cooperation as coordinated by the NSA, is necessary (to emphasise government control and capacity to defend its political system and sovereignty amidst other advantages), yet the Nigerian Government must be open to political solution through dialogue and potential negotiation. Declaring a military offensive against Boko Haram with the aim of stamping out the insurgency in three months is not only ineffective but unrealistic. It will only escalate the crisis, and may further alienate the government from the people, as it will be very difficult to avoid collateral damage. Boko Haram lives among the people. This is urban guerilla warfare, one that our military are illequipped and ill-trained to fight.

Note

1. President Buhari, in an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour on 21 July 2015, said his administration would be willing to negotiate with Boko Haram for the release of the 219 girls held in captivity by the sect.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Michael Nwankpa is a doctoral candidate in the University of Roehampton, London, a visiting scholar at Rice University, Houston, Texas and a terrorism research fellow at the National Consortium for the study of terrorism and response to terrorism (START), University of Maryland. His research interest lies in the dilemma of security, development and human rights, with special focus on the Boko Haram and Niger Delta Conflicts in Nigeria. He has authored several articles, the most recent include 'The political economy of securitisation: The case of Boko Haram, Nigeria' (2015) and 'Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State?' (2015).

References

- Abadie, A. (2004). *Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism* (No. w10859). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Adegbulu, F. (2013). Boko Haram: The emergence of a terrorist sect in Nigeria 2009–2013. *African Identities*, 11(3), 260–273.
- Agbibo, D. (2013). The ongoing campaign of terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the state. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 52, 1–18. doi:10.5334/sta.cl
- Aldrich, D. P. (2012). Mightier than the sword: Social science and development in countering violent extremism. *Frontiers in Development*, 46–50.
- Amnesty International [AI]. (2014). *Nigeria: More than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in north-eastern Nigeria in early 2014*. London: Amnesty International.
- Amnesty International [AI]. (2015). *Our Job is to shoot, slaughter and kill: Boko Haram's reign of terror in north-east Nigeria*. London: Amnesty International.
- Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D., & Zanini, M. (1999). Networks, netwar, and information-age terrorism (chapter 3). In I. Lesser, J. Arquilla, B. Hoffman, D. F. Ronfeldt, & M. Zanini (Eds.), *Countering the new terrorism* (pp. 39–84). Santa Monica, CA: RAND corporation.
- Associated Press [AP]. (2015, March 30). *Boko Haram: Deadly terrorism in Nigeria*. New York: AP Editions.
- Atkinson, S. E., Sandler, T., & Tschirhart, J. (1987). Terrorism in a bargaining framework. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 30(1), 1–21.
- Caruso, R., & Schneider, F. (2011). The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe (1994–2007). *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27, S37–S49.
- Cook, D. (2011). *Boko Haram: A prognosis*. Houston, TX: Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy.
- Cook, D. (2014). *Boko Haram: A new Islamic state in Nigeria*. Houston, TX: Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy.
- Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4), 379–399.
- Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 405–420.
- Deckard, N. D., Barkindo, A., & Jacobson, D. (2015). Religiosity and rebellion in Nigeria: Considering Boko Haram in the radical tradition. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(7), 510–528.

- Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 75–90.
- Forest, J. J. (2012). *Confronting the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria* (No. JSOU-12-5). Macdill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University.
- Ganor, B. (2002). Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter? *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), 287–304.
- Gourley, S. M. (2012). Linkages between Boko Haram and al Qaeda: A potential deadly synergy. *Global Security Studies*, 3(3), 1–14.
- Hoffman, B. (1999). Terrorism trends and prospects (chapter 2). In I. Lesser, J. Arquilla, B. Hoffman, D. F. Ronfeldt, & M. Zanini (Eds.), *Countering the new terrorism* (pp. 7–38). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Hoffman, Bruce. (2004). The changing face of Al Qaeda and the global war on terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27(6), 549–560.
- Horgan, J., & Altier, M. B. (2012). Future of terrorist de-radicalization programs. *The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 13, 83–90.
- Hudson, R. A., & Majeska, M. (1999, September). *The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why?* Washington, DC: Library of Congress.
- Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (2013). *World Report 2013: Nigeria*. Retrieved May 5, 2014, from <http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2013/countrychapters/nigeria/>
- Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (2014). *World Report 2014: Nigeria*. Retrieved May 5, 2014, from <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/nigeria/>
- International Crisis Group [ICG]. (2014). *Curbing violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram insurgency*. Africa Report No. 216. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- Isa, M. K. (2010). Militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria. In W. Okumu & A. Ikelegbe (Eds.), *Militias, rebels and Islamist militants: Human security and state crises in Africa* (pp. 313–340). Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Kaldor, M. (1999). *New wars and old wars: Organized violence in a global era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kaldor, M. (2005). Elaborating the 'new war' thesis (chapter 10). In I. Duyvesteyn & J. Angstrom (Eds.), *Rethinking the nature of war* (pp. 210–224). London: Frank Cass.
- Kilcullen, D. (2006). Counter-insurgency redux. *Survival*, 48(4), 111–130.
- Kiras, J. D. (2007). Irregular warfare: Terrorism and insurgency. *Understanding Modern Warfare*, 224, 186–207.
- Krueger, A. B., & Laitin, D. D. (2008). Kto kogo? A cross-country study of the origins and targets of terrorism. *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness*, 148–173.
- Lake, D. A. (2002). Rational extremism: Understanding terrorism in the twenty-first century. *Dialogue IO*, 1(1), 15–29.
- Laqueur, W. (1996). Postmodern terrorism: New rules for an old game. *Foreign Affairs*, 75(5), 24–36.
- Last, M. (2012). *From dissent to dissidence: The genesis and development of reformist Islamic groups in northern Nigeria* (No. 5). Nigeria Research Network Working Paper. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Loimeier, R. (2012). Boko Haram: The development of a militant religious movement in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 47(2–3), 137–155.
- Lubeck, P. M. (2011). Nigeria: Mapping the sharia restorationist movement. Center for global, international and regional studies. In R.W. Hefner (Ed.), *Shari'a politics: Islamic law and society in the modern world* (pp. 244–279). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Merari, A. (1993). Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 5(4), 213–251.
- Metz, S. (2007). *Rethinking insurgency*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
- Metz, S., & Millen, R. (2005). *Intervention, stabilization, and transformation operations: The role of land-power in the new strategic environment*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
- Millen, R. A. (2007). *The Hobbesian notion of self-preservation concerning human behavior during an insurgency*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
- Murray, G., & Tonge, J. (2005). *Sinn Féin and the SDLP: From alienation to participation*. Dublin: Hurst & Co.

- Neumann, P. R. (2007). Negotiating with terrorists. *Foreign Affairs-New York*, 86(1), 128–138.
- Nwankpa, M. (2014). The politics of amnesty in Nigeria: A comparative analysis of the Boko Haram and Niger delta insurgencies. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 5(1), 67–77.
- Nwankpa, M. (2015a). The political economy of securitization: The case of Boko Haram, Nigeria. *Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, 10(1), 32–39.
- Nwankpa, M. (2015b). *Boko Haram: Whose Islamic state?* Houston, TX: Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy.
- Oshita, O. O. (2007). *Conflict management in Nigeria: Issues and challenges*. London: Adonis & Abbey Pub Limited.
- Osumah, O. (2013). Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal insecurity. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 24(3), 536–560.
- Oyeniyi, B. A. (2014). One voice, multiple tongues: Dialoguing with Boko Haram. *Democracy and Security*, 10(1), 73–97.
- Pew Research Centre, (July, 2014). *Concerns about Islamic extremism on the rise in middle east*. Retrieved October 20, 2015, from <http://www.pewresearch.org>
- Piazza, J. A. (2006). Rooted in poverty? Terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavages 1. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(1), 159–177.
- Rineheart, J. (2010). Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 4(5), 31–27.
- Sampson, I. T. (2013). The dilemmas of counter-bokoharamism: Debating state responses to Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria. *Security Journal*, 0955–1662, 1–25.
- Schmid, A., & Jongman, A. (1988). *Political terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, databases, and literature*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Schmid, A. P. (1992). The response problem as a definition problem. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(4), 7–13.
- Solomon, H. (2012). Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram. *The RUSI Journal*, 157(4), 6–11.
- Speckhard, A., & Akhmedova, K. (2005). Talking to terrorists. *Journal of Psychohistory*, 33(2), 125–156.
- Tilly, C. (2004). Terror, terrorism, terrorists. *Sociological Theory*, 22(1), 5–13.
- Walker, A. (2012). *What is Boko Haram?* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Walzer, M. (2006). Terrorism and just war. *Philosophia*, 34(1), 3–12.
- Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004). The challenges of conceptualizing terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), 777–794.
- Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Perlinger, A. (2008). *Political parties and terrorist groups* (Vol. 10). London: Routledge.
- Wilkinson, P. (2000). The strategic implications of terrorism. In *Terrorism and political violence: A sourcebook* (pp. 19–49). Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research, Haranand Publications.
- Zartman, I. W. & Faure, G.O. (Eds.). (2011). *Engaging extremists: Trade-offs, timing, and diplomacy*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Zenn, J. (2013). The Islamic movement and the Iranian intelligence activities in Nigeria. *Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point (CTC Sentinel)*, 6, 13–18.